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1 Shaping a New International 
Financial System: 
Contributions and Challenges 
KARL KAISER, JOHN J. KIRTON, AND JOSEPH P. DANIELS 
Introduction: The Crisis and the Challenge 
As the 1990s unfolded, citizens of the international community seemed 
destined to bid farewell to a turbulent twentieth century with a ce lebrat ion of 
the end of the European cold war, the global spread of market democracies in 
its wake, and the buoyant prosperity and expanding freedoms they brought. 
Instead, the century closed with the globa l community engu lfed in an 
unprecedentedly severe financial crisis that devastated many of the wor ld ' s 
most rapidly growing economies, threatened the world 's most mature and 
powerful countries. and called into question the mechanism and very model 
of a globalised international economy and community. 
The floating of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 catalysed a contagious 
sequence of financial meltdowns. Over the subsequent year these devastated 
not on ly Thailand but also Indonesia, the world 's fourth most populous 
country, and Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) member South Korea, imperiled such traditional bastion of stable 
growth as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the People' Republic of China, and 
helped plunge the world 's second largest economy, Japan, into deeper 
recession . On 17 August 1997, the crisis spread to Europe. when. three weeks 
after the latest infusion of financial support from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the Group of Eight (G8)'s newest member Russia was forced to 
devalue its currency and default on its loans. Within a month. the globa l panic 
unleashed by the Ru sian default battered other G8 countries sllch as Canada. 
and threatened to paralyse the financial system of the world 's most powerful 
and superb ly performing economy, the United tates . As 1998 moved into 
1999 it was the America's wh ich were afflicted. as Brazil faced a major run 
on its reserves and a sharp recession as a result. As Group of Seven (G7) and 
G8 leaders gathered in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999 tor their 25'h annual 
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ummit, a preca ri ou ca lm preva il ed, a lthough strai ns in Argentina, and later 
South Korea, kept everyone in a state of nervous vig ilance. The foc us had 
hi fted fro m the mirac le to the meltdown of emerging eco nomie in A ia and 
e lsewhere, from the magic to th e mani a of the marketplace, from acco lades to 
anx ieties about g loba li sation, and from the vigour to the vulnerab ility of the 
leadin g industri a l democrac ies and the internati onal institutions they had 
constructed to govern globa l fin ance. 
The G7 countries themse lves escaped, ifby the nan'owe t of margins, the 
most devastating effects of the cri s is. But fo r the many countri es who did not, 
, the destructi on it brought surpassed that of the great depress ion of the 193 0s. 
Moreover, the speed with whi ch it spread, the broad scope of the countri e it 
wept up in its grasp, and the wide number of individuals within them whose 
life prospects were destroyed, gave it a unique characte r. T he failure of the 
world 's leading national authorities, internationa l. in stitutions, or market 
actors to foresee its outbreak, predict its course, o r confidently contain its 
cumulati ve devastation re inforced the co ll ecti ve rea l isati on that the 
international financ ia l economy of the twen'ty-first century was very di ffe rent 
in kind than that whi ch had proceeded it. The cri s is a lso made obv ious that, 
in an interdependent wor ld economy, more than mere openness to fore ign 
capita l and a free in vestment clim ate was necessary to guara ntee a stable 
evo lution, but that many conditions for the deve lopment of market econom ies 
in the developed world , whi ch had been v ita l but genera lly overlooked. were 
of equa l importance, such as the rule of law, regulati ons concernin g the 
re li abili ty of balance sheets, bankruptcy law, or rul es fo rbiddin g corrupti on. 
It further bred a convict ion that a fundamentally new architecture for its 
inte rnat ional governance had to be constructed if an open inte rnational 
fin anc ia l system was to continue, and be contro ll ed in ways that benefited a ll. 
The challenge of creating that new architecture unleashed a series of 
intense debates over several fundamental and interre lated questions. What 
was the rea l cause of the Asian financ ial cris is and the contag ion which 
brought it w ith such fo rce to most reg ions of the world , and to many, but not 
a ll , of the countries w ithin them? How best could the c ris is be conta ined and 
who should take the lead, and bea r the burden , in so doing? Was there a truly 
g loba l ised rather than regiona l ised inte rnational economy. and to what degree 
and in what ways was it different than that which had proceeded it? Was a 
new architecture required to govern it, o r merely a et of improvements and 
additi ons for the plumbing and the metres that regul ated and monitored it? 
What principles and processes should guide the renovation effort, and what 
new procedures and mechanisms hould be put in place? And who, within 
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international institutions, national governm ents, privare markets. c ivi I soc iety. 
and citizens of an ever more connected global community. should guide and 
govern the emerg ing market sy tem '? 
These debates st ill rage in intell ectual irc les. But long betore they will 
have come to command a consensus, indeed from the very ea rly stages of the 
crisis, leaders of the international com munity equipped with only tentative 
answers and fragile confidence have been forced to confront the crisis and 
begin constructing an architecture that could cope with ir, conta in it. and 
vastly reduce the chances that it would return . In doing so they had to in ve nt 
and institute a structure that would meet the needs of an increas ingly 
globalised financial system and the a piration of those throughout the world 
we ll beyond the financial community who were so proto undly affected by it. 
It was an effort that mobili sed the energies and enthusiasm of many. But at the 
very centre of the effort were the deliberations, debates,. clirections. and 
dec isions of the Group of Seven lead ing industri al democracies . 
The Approach 
This book explores the eff0l1 to conta in the global financial cri s is that erupted 
in 1997, to construct a new international financial system in its wake, and 
fo rmali se the role in this process of the G7, it international institutional 
co ll eagues and competitors, and its member governments and tinancial 
communities. It embraces a ll of the fundamental questions unleashed by the 
crisis that still dominate analytical and policy debates. Yet its tocus is on how 
well the cris is response and reconstruction 'effort. importantl y shaped and 
guided by the G7, has proceeded as the new century beg ins. 
This collection thus has three central purposes. First and toremost, it 
criti ca lly assesses efforts thus far to construct a new. strengthened 
international financial system to meet the needs of the globa l economy and 
community in the rapidly global ising world of the twenty- first century. 
Second Iy, it challenges core elements of the .ep istem ic consensus underlyi ng 
thi s effort by subjecting the premises and principles of the emerging ed iticc 
to a hard analysis of their economic logic, market impact. and political 
feasibi lity . Thirdly, it offers suggestions about which directions 1'0 avo id. and 
which to pursue as the project to construct a strengthened international 
fin ancial system moves into the decisive tinal stages required tor its 
completion . 
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To meet these objectives, thi s collection assembles the analyses ofl eading 
experts from the scho larly and po l icy world . It embraces the talents of those 
within government, private sector finance, and the academic/resea rch 
community. Its analysis is firmly grounded in the economics of international 
finance, and supplemented by the ins ights of political sc ience and 
management studies. It includes experts from Europe, North America and 
Asia, and from all G7 member countries, as well as a v iew from the world 
outside. In many cases the insights of these authors have been shaped by their 
direct experience. in the past or present, in shaping and manag ing the 
j international financial system. But in all cases they bring to bear outstanding 
academic and analytic credentials and the critical di stance that tlows from 
them . 
No effort has been made to impose a common analytical or interpretive 
framework to guide these contributions. Each has \2een guided by the dual 
discipline of focussing on fundamental issues in the effort to shape a 
strengthened financial system, and to do so in a critical spirit guided by an 
independent analysis of underlying premises and processes . As a result, thi s 
collection reflects the diversity of the debate and points to new directions for 
advance, as each author addresses the core issues from a distinctive vantage 
point. 
The Core Issues 
Taken together, these analyses address the five core issues at the heart of the 
contemporary debate over shaping a strengthened international financial 
system . These deal with why the crisis came, how well the existing system 
responded, what more is needed now, which sector should bear the burden, 
and who should take the lead . 
The first concerns the causes of the crisis and contagion and whethe r it 
has now been finally contained. How different was it from panics, manias. 
and depress ions past? With the ins ights generated by the Mexica n pe 0 
deva luation of December 20. 1994, the collapse of Barings Bank in the spring 
of 1995. and the focus of the G7 on internationa l financial system reform at 
their 1995 Ha lifax Summit, could it have been anticipated and prevented? 
Was the crisis fundamentally the result of a collection of po licy and 
institutional defects with in particu lar countries, if at broadly s im i lar stages of 
development, or was the crisis essentially driven by the dynam ics of a newly 
globalised international system and the inadequacies of the principles. 
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procedures, and institutions for its governance? Has enough n o \~ bcen done 
to contain and conclude the c ri s is. or is· there mere ly a current respi te until it 
resumes in its next stage? 
The second core issue, flowing directly from the first , is how and how 
well the international community has coped with the challenges o r crisi s 
response and system strengthening thus far. Is the challenge one of calling for 
incremental reform, deeper reconstruction. or historic replacement with a very 
new system of principles practices, processes, and set of institutions? Whether 
the challenge be one of architecture or plumbing, is the project proceeding 
quickly enough? And is it unfolding in the correct direction. with an overall 
coherence and adequate allowance for experimentation. and subsequent m id-
course correction? 
The third core iss ue focusses on the particular critical defects of the o ld 
system and the best design for the new mechanisms to be added in respo nse. 
What is the best weighting and mix of mechanisms for transparency. 
surveillance, precautionary lending, and international standstill or bankrupt€y 
procedures? What are the best forms, procedures, and equence of 
introduction and lise for each? Is it necessary to move into broader domains. 
such as control of international financial and capital flows, greater exchange 
rate management, fixity, or even currency unification. and the rul es for 
internationalliberalisation or foreign direct investment? How does one guard 
against consequences such as moral hazard? 
The fourth issue is the relative respons ibility and ro le - pa. t and 
prospective, positive and normative - of international in stitutions. nati onal 
governments. and private sector market players in the design and operation of 
the new system . How much and how should the principle of private sector 
burden sharing be instituted? What volume and form of additional public 
sector resources are required and where should they come from and be 
controlled? And what place do other civil soc iety actors and the ir concern 
have in the new architecture? 
The fifth issue is the past, present, and prospective role of the G7, its 
governments, the financial community and citizens. in prov iding leadership 
and guidance in the construction and governa nce of the new system . Is it the 
United States alone or the G7 as a co llective that has been. and remai ns the 
necessa ry centre of leadership and guidance? What ha been the ro le . and 
what role should broader processes such as tlie new Group of 22 (G22) and 
now Group of Twenty (G20) and Financial Stability Forum (FSF) o r the 
established IMF, World 8ank, International Organisation of Securities 
Control Organisations (IOSCO) and other bodies play? And what is the best 
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practi ca l fo rmula fo r in vo lving those outs ide th e ex istin g centres of 
internati onal fin anc ia l govern ance, so that the necessary ex perti se. leg it im acy. 
surve i Ilance, and sanctions can be secured? 
The Analyses 
To address these core iss ues. it is necessary to explore in turn ea rl ier effo rts 
to shape and strengthen the internati ona l fin anc ia l system. the actua l c ri ses o f 
, 1997-99, the spec ific issues at the hea rt of current effOlt to construct a new 
system, and the broader array of iss ues c lose ly re lated to the proces . T hu , 
Part I considers past successes and fa i lures through the current cri s is. from its 
o rig ins in Asia, through its impact on emerging and G7 economies around the 
world , and the response of the G7 and its membi!rs at conta inment and 
contro l. 
Chapter 2 beg ins w ith an ana lys is of efforts durin g th e past quarter 
century to reform the internationa l fi nanc ia l system. and the ro le of the G7 in 
thi s enterpri se. In examining "The G7 Summit ' s Contribution: Past. Present, 
and Prospective". Nicho las Bayne identi fies four earlie r definin g moments 
when the world , and the G7, confro nted as a centra l cha ll enge the task of 
a lte ring in bas ic ways a fi nancia l system under severe stress. The fi rst was the 
cris is over the g loba l exchange rate regime that served as very ra i.l'ol7 d 'eIr e 
fo r the birth of the G7 sUll1mit as an economic institution - the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971. th e fa ilure of the 
IM F and ex istin g processes to construct a durable, w ide ly accepted 
a ltern ative, and the dec is ion of the fi rst Summit at Rambouill et, France in 
1975 to institute a new system of managed fl oating. T he second was the 
commerc ia l bank debt cris is prec ipita ted by Mex ico ' s de./clclo defa ult at th e 
1M F meetin gs in To ronto in 1982. and the work of G7 ull1m its fro m 
Versa ill es in 1982 to Pa ri s in 1989 to arrive ti nal ly, in the form of the Brady 
Plan, at a so lution. The third episode, debt re lief fo r the worl d ' s poorest 
countries, began with the "Toronto terms" fo r re lief at the 1998 Summit and 
cont inued through to the Co logne de bt initiat ive of 1999. The fi nal quest fo r 
the G7 has been its effort to cope with specul ati ve fi nanc ia l crises. startin g at 
Ha li fax in 1995 and continuing to the present day . 
From thi s ana lys is tl ow five conc lus ions. The tirst is the unique 
opportuni ty the Summit o ffers G7 leaders to reso lve issues that have detied 
so lution at lower leve l . T he second is the need fo r adva nce prepa rat ion so 
leaders can use the ir t ime most effective ly. whil e the third is the need to keep 
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up the hi gh leve l pressure until commitments are fo rged and implemented . 
The fourth is the need to move beyond the info rm a l leadership or th e (j7 tll 
integrate the new arrangements into formal o rga ni sati ons and give them lega l 
force. The fifth is the indi spensable need for the G7 to lead. but a lso through 
the ir own example. exp lanation, and sensiti vity to the des ires of outs ide rs. to 
secure a broader acceptance for the ir actions. 
In Chapter 3, "The Asian Cri s is and its Implications". Takashi Kiuchi 
looks. from a Japanese perspective, at the o ri g ins and cau es of the A ian 
tinancial crisis. Japan ' s interpretation of and response to the c ri s is. and the 
lessons that can be appl ied to the task of rebu i Iding the inte rnationa I tinanc ia I 
a rchitecture. He locates the ultimate causes of the cris is in capi ta l account 
rather than current account problems. I iq uid ity rather than ' o lvency problem s. 
and the he rding behaviour of investors. but notes a lso how po liti c ians 
overriding th e ir offic ia ls and regulators compounded the problem . .Iapan·s 
re ponse came initia lly in the form o f a proposa l to r an As ian moneta ry fund 
that was abandoned in the face orus oppos ition. then with a "New M iyazawa 
Ini tiative" of US$30 billion worth of bilateral lending guarantees. proposa ls 
to reform the IM F. and new measures to make the yen an internati onal 
currency. The major lessons orthe cri s is. Kiuchi concludes. are the need to r 
dec isive action at early stages. for enhancing the I MF s authority to dea l w ith 
capital account problems. and closer regional po l icy co-ordinati on. beginn ing 
w ith macroeconomic po licy and the development of an As ian bond market to 
replace short-term borrowing from di stant bankers. 
Kiuch i ' s analys is leads him to c lear conclus ions on many of the key issues 
in the debate over a new architecture. He rejects dollarisation as a so lution lo r 
sma ll er Asian economies, but approves of short terms ca pital restri ct ions as 
a trans itional measure. mandatory private sector burden harin g. and state 
bankruptcy codes. He ca ll s for universa l guide l ines and processes lo r 
accounting, disclosure. bankruptcy. and tinancial supervis ion. But heca ll s tor 
a staged approach to introduce these new mea ure . ti g htl y ta il o red to the 
particular s ituation of each country, w ith proper macroeconomic policy 
re inforc ing improved internat ional regul at io l) . Aboveall. he identities the rol e 
o f the G7 in mov ing toward a dell/C/O target zone mechani m. and points to 
the benefits that further moves in this directi on co uld bring. 
In hapter 4. ''The G7. I ntern ati ona l Finance. and Deve loping Countries". 
Duncan Wood analyses the work o f th e G7 ill operating and re lo rming the 
international financial system from the per pective o f tht: devdop ill g 
countries. in particular, that of the ten large emerging market econom ies . The 
chapter first explores the record of the G7 during the decade from the late 
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1980s to the late 1990s, identi fy ing how the developing countries have been 
affected by G7 initiati ves in macroeconomic co-ordination. debt renegotiation 
and reduction , and internat iona l financial sy tem reform . It then focusses on 
the main ach ievements of the 1999 Co logne Summ it that affect developing 
countries, notably the Cologne debt initiative, broadening the membership of 
the Financial Stability Forum, and the increased impOJ1ance accorded to the 
IMF Interim Committee, now renamed the International Financial and 
Monetary Committee. Wood a lso examines why and how the G7 might move 
toward a more meaningfu l dialogue with , and inclusion of, the major 
,emerging economies, in the interest of improv ing the effectiveness and 
leg itimacy of the intern ational financial system be ing shaped to govern the 
g lobal economy of the future. 
Wood 's conc lusions are critical yet constructive. He .iudges that the G 7 
in the past has inadequate ly incorporated the views of developing cou ntrie 
as it has dealt with the issues that directly concern tl;em. While the Co logne 
Summit brought some improvement, its advances remain inadequate to the 
need to involve the large emerging economies as they ri se in re lati ve power, 
and" as their economic performance becomes ever more consequential to that 
of the G7 countries themselves. The clear need is to dev i e better proce ses 
for regular, formali sed G7-emerging economy dialogue and consultat ion, 
based in part on the models that other international institutions have recently 
evo lved. 
In Chapter 5, "The Dynamics ofG7 Leadership in Cri sis Response and 
System Reconstructi on " John 1. Kirton explores the ro le of the G7, and of the 
lesser members within it, in responding to the crisis and constructi ng a new 
international tinancial archi tecture. He traces the diplomacy of and within the 
G7 through the three phases of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the g loba l cris is 
of 1998 and the reconstructi on effort culm inating at the o logne Summit in 
June 1999. In doing so he highlights how it was the G7 co ll ect ive ly that 
ultimate ly prevailed, rather than the US a lone, the IMF as a broad multilatera l 
organisation locked in a neo-l ibera l mode l. or private sector markets and 
multinational corporations. FUJ1her affi rming the leadership of the G7 
co llective ly, rather than as a support group for American leadership. Kirton 
demonstrates how Canada and Britain, the least powerful member. were ab le 
to provide effective intellectual , policy, and tructural leadership by 
advanc ing distinctive positions, combining with other members. and 
persisting to see their principles and positions preva il in the end . 
Kirton' s analys is chall enges the traditional theories of why and how 
effective G7 co-operation has been achieved . In contrast to theories based on 
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the indispensable element of an American willingness and ability to lead. hc 
shows how the G7 came together at the initiative of other members in the face 
of a reluctant America deterred and immobilised at first by Congre s ional 
opposition to authorising the US share of a quota increase for the IMF. and in 
September 1998 by panicking market players on the verge of freezing its 
domestic credit system. Nor of great relevance in inducing collective G7 
action were common lessons from the distant past, a false new consensu 
about the impotence of governments in the face of powerful markets and 
private capital flows, transnational coal itions involving sub-governmental and 
societal actors, or traditional differences between G7 members. Rather. the 
autonomous power of international institutions was evident as Canada and 
Britain were able to use their prerogatives and legacy as G7 hosts. and the G7 
norms of consensus decision making to take and sustain a leadership role. 
Most importantly, it was the particular character of the G7 as a modern 
international concert, in the face ofa systemic crisis, that allowed the smaller 
members to lead the G7, and the G7 to lead the international community with 
success . 
Part II moves from the crisis, its consequences. and its containment to the 
particular core issues that dominated the debate over the principles and 
procedures on which a new international financial system should be based . 
I n Chapter 6, "Transparentising the Global Money Busine s: G lasnost or 
Just Another Wild Card in Play?", George M. von Furstenberg explores the 
different meanings of the now highly fashionable concept of "transparency". 
Noting that greater transparency always involves a redistribution of power. he 
distinguishes between statistical transparency and political transparency, or 
glasnost, and highlights how both were evident in abundance in the decisions 
of financial system reform at the Cologne Summit. 
Given the many forms of uncertainty that exist in econom ic analysis, and 
the capacity of both "offensive" and "defensive" players to benefit from more 
information , von Furstenberg calls for greater skepticism on the part of 
policymakers and commentators about the progress to be made by securin g 
greater statistical transparency alone. Indeed. he notes. a denial of data had 
little to do with the outbreak of recent financial crises in developing 
econom ies. and he judges that the greater transparency currently envisaged by 
the G7 will do very little to reduce the risk of future tinancial crises. He does. 
however, judge political transparency to be important. if it is linked to a 
comprehensive program of reform, while hi ghlighting how it is the rich 
players in the rich countries who are likely to benefit the most. 
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In Chapter 7, "G lobal Cap ital Flows: Maximi ing Benetits. Minimising 
Ri sks". Joseph P. Daniels examines policy responses of the G7 in li ght of the 
perce ived benefits and problem of libera li ed capital markets. He tirst 
explai ns the economic benefits of liberali sed financial markets and high 
quality intermediaries. ext he con iders the problems that pervade tinancial 
markets and the constraints that capital mobility places on macroeconomic 
po li cy. Additionally the role offore ign speculators in the East Asian cri ses is 
considered. 
Given the preceding arguments, Daniels considers the proposal put 
• forward in the G7 Finance Ministers' Strengthening the !lIternatirmo! 
Financial Architecture: Report of the (i 7 Finance Min ister.l· to the Kii!11 
Economic Summit. He fi nds that many recommendat ions su pport the pri nc i p Ie 
of minimal market interference and avo id crea ting additional ri sk or 
diminishing country credibility. Unfortunately, he also I'inds that the G7 has 
offered little to the likely candidates offuture tlnancialmeltdowns. the larger 
developing nations at an intermediate stage of financial development. Hence. 
he concurs with the general view of Duncan Wood in Chapter 4. Daniels 
concludes by suggest ing a set of re ponsibilities for the G7 in the reform 
process. 
In Chapter 8, "The ew Financial Architecture forthe Globa l Economy'·. 
orbert Walter take up the debate over tran parency. and over several other 
central issues. notably the new Financial Stability Forum. equity ratio for 
financial institutions. supervi ion. and the broader questions surrounding 
Russ ia and the international trade system. Declaring that little has been done 
to reform the system to cope with another financial cri s is that is sure to come. 
he casts doubt of the adequacy of the GTs emphasis on surve illance and the 
re pon ibility of each country to maintain a sound economic po licy. U eful 
advances such as the Financial tability Forum and improved eq uity ratios for 
financial institutions still require further work on the important detail s. 
Additionally, calls for greater transparency and surveillance suffer from the 
fact that in a world of "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" . the resulting 
systems will be ba ed on American models that other G7 governments, such 
as Germany. will resist. _ 
More important. in Walter' view. is the fact that two fundam ental issues 
have yet to be sati sfactoril y addressed. The lirst i the need to r a mechanism 
to a llow bankruptcy to take place in the tlnancial sector. The second is for G7 
governments to stop the recapitalisation or excess ive capita li sation of ailing 
financial institutions. 
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In Cha pter 9, " The Ro le of the Internati onal Monetary Fun d as Lender or 
Last Resort" , Curz io G iannini exa mines how a lende r of last re o rt ca n deal 
w ith financial instabili ty at the nati ona l leve l and \' hether the conccpt of an 
inte rnationall ender of last re o rt makes en e in today'sglobalise I economy. 
At the nati onal leve l, he notes, the moneta ry framework and hence the lende r 
of last resort functio n has now become very di ffe rent from those spec ifi ed in 
th e c lassic model, as independent central banks have a ri sen to practice 
" illuminated di scretion" in pursuit ofa tab ility-oriented monetary policy. At 
the inte rnationa l leveL while the founders o f the Bretton Wood ystem kept 
the lender of last resort function at the national level, the question is now what 
ca n be done as a lender of last resort in a g lobal environment. 
Gianninni's conclus ion is that very littl e can be done, as any g rand des ign 
to transfer the lende r of last resort function to th e internationa l Ie e l should 
be regarded w ith uspic ion. Indeed. the IM F is already movi ng in the othe r 
direction. by providing c redibility so otherwi se tinancially frozen cou ntri es 
can bo rrow for pri vate ca pital markets, by lending into a rrea rs. and by 
invo lv ing pri vate c redito rs through info rmal means in the Korea n rescue 
package. G inannini thus approves of the creation of contingent c red it lines. 
and further moves to make creditors more sensi ti ve to the risks th ey take. 
through ei ther improved worldwide regul ation and supe rvisio n or debt 
moratoriums w ith negotiated restructuring, The new Financia l Stab ilit 
Forum , with its emphasis on th e fo rm er. faces a daunting task . But its very 
creati on and early emphas is suggest that the IMF should refi ne its ro le ora 
provider of c redibility, support moothe r workout procedure. and avo id 
thinking of itse lf as a world centra l bank. 
Part III moves from the debate over core financia l questions to the broader 
iss ues c lose ly re lated to th em and ones w ho e treatm ent co uld we ll afrect the 
particular measures se lected and the success of the ir use. 
In C hapte r 10, "' Practi s ing Exchange Rate Flex ibility" . li v ie r Davanne 
and Pierre Jacquet examine the question. now at the centre o r the debate. of ' 
the appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerg ing and deve loped econom ies. 
and of the best international mechani sm for ensuring the needed tability in 
the face of ever-threatening vo lat ili ty, mi sa li gnment. and some times brutal 
hifts from an unduly fixed to a free floating reg ime, They outline the current 
consensus regarding the dangers of fixed exc han ge rates lo r emerging 
economies, and the costs of the a lternati ve, forcibly adopted by many in the 
wake of th e 1997-99 fin anc ia l cri s is. of freely tl oating reg imes . They thcn 
exa mine the advantages ora managed fl oatin g regime. and the ro le the G7 and 
IM F play mi ght play in effective ly manag in g it. 
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Through their deta iled economic and institutional. theoretica l and 
empirica l analys is, Jacquet and Davanne make a powerful argu ment that the 
current consensus needs to be rethought. Both econom ic rational ity and the 
record of past decades show that exchange rate fl ex ibility is necessary, and 
that highly fi xed exchange rate regimes should be re lied upon only 
exceptionally. Yet there is a broader array of avai lable options, within which 
stands out an "adjustable reference parity" reg ime. I n managing such a 
reg ime, the G7 and IMF, working in tandem. can do much to strengthen 
monitoring and surve illance, and thus contribute substantia lly to exchange 
• rate stability. 
In hapter I I. "Can Small Countries Keep Their Own Money and 
Floating Exchange Rates?" . George M. von Furstenberg looks inward at a 
central issue of finance - that of exchange rates - and outward from the G7 at 
the sma ller countries in the system. He asks in p~ rt ic ula r what choice of 
exchange rate reg imes ex ist for sma ll countries that have full y opened up to 
internationa l capital markets and free trade in financial services when they are 
located in the vicinity of a large country or group of countries whose currency 
is in wide international use. With G7 Finance Ministers in the lead up to 
Cologne advising that such countries' should genera lly not defend fixed 
exchange rates with borrowed money, and with most countries save fo r China 
hav ing lifted traditional capital contro ls. the options fo r such countries reduce 
to floating exchange rates, currency boards, and monetary unions. 
Von Furstenberg concludes that the first two of these options. fo r small 
and medium-sized countries with low credibility currencies. brings major 
problems of currency substi tution and incomplete hedging, to the point where 
policy makers are dri ven to look at monetary union as a sa te haven. Monetary 
union can take the form of unilatera lly adopting as lega l tender the strong 
international currency of a nea rby country, or the multilateral Euroland route 
of deep financial integration on the basis of equality. The trend is thus toward 
reg ional currency conso l idation, the disappearance of many lesser currencies. 
and the separate exchange rates and national monetary poli cies th"t 
accompany them. 
Fi nally, in Chapter 12. "From Globa li sation to Regionalism: The Foreign 
Direct Investment Dimension oflntemational Finance", Alan M. Rugman broadens 
the focus from the activities of short-term investors in financial capital to the 
long-term toreign direct investment of mul tinational corporati on (M Cs). He 
traces the ri se and role of MNCs. how they vary widely by sector in their 
degree of globali sation, and the politica l power they exert in the face or 
national governments and intergovernmental organi sations. In doing so. he 
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takes is ue w ith those who emphas ise the de tabi li ing impact o r vo latile 
hort-term financial tlows in a world of g loba li sed "cas ino capitalism" . 
Rather, Rugman argues. th e proces of internati onal integrati on is driven 
by the stable, fo reign direct investm ents o f M Cs. wh ich engage 
overwhe lmingly in a regionali sm based o n the rich triad count ri es or the US. 
Europe, and Japan , rather than any comprehens ive g lobali sm. For both triad-
based MNCs in their production and marketing. and fo r governm ents in their 
e fforts to support and regulate the process by creating international trade and 
investment regimes. it is the home region rathe r than the wider wor ld that is 
primary. The collapse of Asian economic growth in 1997 and the contagious 
worldwide economic s lowdown and contagion of 1998-99 was a result in part 
of the failure of Asian-based firm s and governments to deve lop. through the 
A ia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) or otherwi se, as strong 
and successful a regional strategy and reg ime as those o r the ir North 
American and European counterparts with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). Fu rther. the crisis 0.1' 
1997-99 has driven a ll to turn even more away from globa l strategy to the 
relative safety of their regional bastions. 
Agreement on Fundamental Issues 
Am idst the wea lth of ins ight and analysis that these chapters conta i n. th ere are 
underly ing agreements on many fund amental issues. Above all. the 
contributors critica lly assess and challenge many core e lements of the 
emerging consensus in po li cy and outside inte ll ectual ci rc les about the new 
ystem currently being constructed . Avo iding any temptation to ce lebrate the 
accomplish ments of the G7 guided effort thus far. they o ffe r at best a cautious 
confidence that much of the crisis response and system construction e ffo rt is 
proceeding with competence and often in the correct directi on. They sec. 
however. that there is no ground for complacency or inaction. 
In "'Challenges and Contributions to the Conventional Wisdom". the linal 
chapter of this text', Kai ser, Kirton , and Dani'e ls summari se th e views of the 
various contributors by issue area . On th e ti ve fundamental questi ons at the 
heart of the inte llectual debate and po licy effo rt. the contributors offer :In 
array of views, but also a large measure of :lgreement on what W:l S. is be ing. 
and should be done . Taken together. the e make a 'ubstantial contribution to 
our understanding o f the debate over the international financial system thc 
world needs to cope with in the twenty-tirst century . 
